Artículo de "The Economist"
Por: Carlos Rodrigo Zapata C.
El artículo de The Economist es una reseña breve de la demanda interpuesta por Bolivia contra Chile ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) de La Haya, así como de la primera escaramuza habida, centrada en el intento de Chile de cuestionar la competencia de la CIJ para emitir un fallo sobre dicha demanda. Hasta ahí podríamos decir que el artículo es relativamente equilibrado (ver artículo más abajo).
No obstante, en uno de sus párrafos señala: "Only if the ICJ rejects
Chile’s position, or defers a decision, will it consider Bolivia’s claim
that Chile has an “obligation to negotiate” access to the sea. That,
Chile will argue, is a dangerous notion. It would overturn the treaty
that ended hostilities between the two countries, and thus pose a threat
to the system of treaties that undergirds much international law. If
that is right, more is at stake in the Dutch courtroom than Bolivia’s
hankering for beachfront property."
Es decir: "Sólo si la CIJ rechaza la posición de Chile, o aplaza una decisión, tendrá que tomar en cuenta la demanda de Bolivia de en sentido que Chile tiene una "obligación de negociar" acceso al mar. Eso, Chile argumentará, es una noción peligrosa. Sería revocar el tratado que puso fin a las hostilidades entre los dos países, y por tanto representa una amenaza para el sistema de tratados que subyace a buena parte del derecho internacional. Si eso es correcto, hay más en juego en la sala del tribunal holandés que el anhelo de Bolivia de obtener una propiedad frente al mar." (Traducción propia)
La parte que llama la atención se refiere a la última oración: "Si eso es correcto, hay más en juego en la sala del tribunal holandés que el anhelo de Bolivia de obtener una propiedad frente al mar." Es decir, el artículo pretende ejercer presión sobre los jueces de La Haya poniendo en duda que los jueces sólo tengan en mente el “anhelo de Bolivia de obtener una propiedad frente al mar", pues habría “más en juego” que lo que se revela. Deja la pregunta tendida, la duda, la sospecha, en sentido que los jueces de La Haya tendrían que tramar algo que afecte al sistema de tratados internacional como para avenirse a dar curso al “anhelo” boliviano.
En suma, el título del artículo y este párrafo muestran que Bolivia debe hacer un seguimiento cuidadoso y exhaustivo a los medios de difusión, puesto que de otro modo se podría sembrar una leyenda del trastorno del sistema de tratados que se derivaría de la demanda de acceso soberano al mar que Bolivia tiene desde que fue despojado de él hace 136 años.
Es decir: "Sólo si la CIJ rechaza la posición de Chile, o aplaza una decisión, tendrá que tomar en cuenta la demanda de Bolivia de en sentido que Chile tiene una "obligación de negociar" acceso al mar. Eso, Chile argumentará, es una noción peligrosa. Sería revocar el tratado que puso fin a las hostilidades entre los dos países, y por tanto representa una amenaza para el sistema de tratados que subyace a buena parte del derecho internacional. Si eso es correcto, hay más en juego en la sala del tribunal holandés que el anhelo de Bolivia de obtener una propiedad frente al mar." (Traducción propia)
La parte que llama la atención se refiere a la última oración: "Si eso es correcto, hay más en juego en la sala del tribunal holandés que el anhelo de Bolivia de obtener una propiedad frente al mar." Es decir, el artículo pretende ejercer presión sobre los jueces de La Haya poniendo en duda que los jueces sólo tengan en mente el “anhelo de Bolivia de obtener una propiedad frente al mar", pues habría “más en juego” que lo que se revela. Deja la pregunta tendida, la duda, la sospecha, en sentido que los jueces de La Haya tendrían que tramar algo que afecte al sistema de tratados internacional como para avenirse a dar curso al “anhelo” boliviano.
En suma, el título del artículo y este párrafo muestran que Bolivia debe hacer un seguimiento cuidadoso y exhaustivo a los medios de difusión, puesto que de otro modo se podría sembrar una leyenda del trastorno del sistema de tratados que se derivaría de la demanda de acceso soberano al mar que Bolivia tiene desde que fue despojado de él hace 136 años.
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Bolivia’s access to the sea
Beaches of the future?
A South American border dispute has implications for international law
On May 4th Bolivia’s quest entered a new phase when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague began hearings on its demand for Chile to grant it “sovereign access to the sea”, ie, territory that would reconnect it to the Pacific Ocean. The government commissioned 35 musicians to record a song, “Beaches of the Future”, to drum up international support.
It faces long odds. The first hearings address Chile’s objection to the whole procedure on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction in the matter. Only if the ICJ rejects Chile’s position, or defers a decision, will it consider Bolivia’s claim that Chile has an “obligation to negotiate” access to the sea. That, Chile will argue, is a dangerous notion. It would overturn the treaty that ended hostilities between the two countries, and thus pose a threat to the system of treaties that undergirds much international law. If that is right, more is at stake in the Dutch courtroom than Bolivia’s hankering for beachfront property.
The struggle has its origin in the exploitation of nitrates, used for fertiliser and to make saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder, in the Bolivian littoral, whose sparse population was mainly Chilean. Angered by an increase in Bolivian tax on nitrate miners, Chile invaded the port of Antofagasta in 1879. By the end of the four-year war it had also defeated Peru, which had allied with Bolivia, annexing its departments of Arica and Tacna (see map). In all, Bolivia lost 400km (250 miles) of coastline and 120,000 square km of territory. Peace was concluded only with a “treaty of peace and friendship” in 1904, under which Bolivia accepted the loss of its Pacific coast. In return Chile promised Bolivia “the fullest and freest” commercial transit.
Although Bolivia has its own customs officials and storage in Arica and Antofagasta, it complains that Chile has created an obstacle course for exporters. It subjects Bolivian cargo to unwarranted inspections, for example. Bolivia’s constitution, enacted in 2009 under the current president, Evo Morales, calls access to the Pacific an “irrevocable right”.
That frustrated ambition has made for a relationship with Chile that is at once prickly and intimate. The two countries’ citizens can cross the border without passports, and most Bolivian goods have duty-free access to Chile’s market. Despite the obstacles, two-thirds of Bolivia’s long-distance trade passes through Chilean ports.
Yet liberal, outward-looking Chile has little rapport with the left-wing nationalists who currently govern Bolivia. Commerce lags behind its potential. Chilean companies, avid investors in neighbouring countries, have risked hardly any money in Bolivia. In turn, Bolivia has spurned big opportunities merely to spite Chile. A president who wanted to export gas through Chilean ports was forced out of office in 2003. In a referendum the following year, voters said Bolivia should use gas as a negotiating tool to gain access to the Pacific.
With the suit at the ICJ, Bolivia is trying a new tack. It insists that this is not an attempt to reopen the 1904 treaty, as Chile alleges. Instead, Chile “brought itself into a new kind of international obligation” by repeatedly offering Bolivia some sort of access to the sea after the treaty came into force, argues Mr Rodríguez. In 1975, for example, Chile’s dictator Augusto Pinochet, fearing war with Argentina and Peru, offered Bolivia a corridor in territory that had belonged to Peru. Peru vetoed that plan. It has that right under the treaty that restored Tacna to its control in 1929. No matter, says Bolivia. Chile is still bound by the obligation to negotiate that its offers gave rise to.
This line of argument leaves Chilean officials aghast. It is “unheard of”, says Heraldo Muñoz, who was Chile’s foreign minister until the president asked her cabinet to resign on May 6th (see Bello). Bolivia is not merely asking for dialogue, which Chile would enter into, but negotiations under court order “with only one outcome”. The ICJ has no business judging the matter. Both countries are parties to the Pact of Bogotá, which obliges signatories to submit disputes to international tribunals. But the pact excludes conflicts that were settled before 1948. Even if the court claims competence, Chile is confident it will not issue a judgment that would call into question borders long settled by treaty.
The ICJ is likely to rule this year on Chile’s motion to dismiss the case, or to defer a decision until it considers Bolivia’s claim. A finding for Bolivia would not end the saga. Negotiations would drag on, and could wind up back in court. No Chilean government would dare to surrender territory to Bolivia, at least not without compensation, perhaps in the form of a land swap. Even if Chile were willing, Peru could exercise its veto again.
If Bolivia and Chile cannot resolve the dispute, they could try to work around it. Chile admits that there is room for improvement in the free-transit regime. Some suggest it could offer Bolivia a lease on an enclave over which it would retain sovereignty, similar to China’s former arrangement with Britain over part of Hong Kong. But no solution short of sovereignty will satisfy Bolivia. It “will never stop claiming”, says Bolivia’s man in The Hague.
Editor's note: Chile's government has confirmed that Mr Muñoz will remain foreign minister.
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21650578-south-american-border-dispute-has-implications-international-law-beaches-future?fsrc=scn%2Ffb%2Fte%2Fpe%2Fed%2Fbeachesofthefuture